The Privation of Good and the Missing of the Mark: A Theological Inquiry into the Origin of Evil and the Nature of Sin

Þe Wantynge of Goodnesse and Þe Missynge of Þe Marke: A Godlore Enquirie into Þe Spryngynge of Eville and Þe Kynde of Synne

善之缺乏與失的之箭：論惡之起源與罪之本質之神學探究

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Prolegomenon / Foreworde / 序論

The question *"If God is good and righteous, why do evil and sin exist?"* has animated theological inquiry since antiquity. It is the animating fire of theodicy—the *justification of God* (θεοδικία)—and it demands not merely philosophical speculation but exegetical precision rooted in the testimony of Scripture itself.

Þe questioun, *"Yif God be good and ryghtwis, wherfore existeþ eville and synne?"*, haþ stirred þe enquiries of godlore-clerkes syn tymes of olde. It is þe quykenynge fyre of

theodicye—þe *ryghtwising of God*—and it demandeþ nat merely wisdomlore-thinkynge but *writte-redynge* precisioun yroted in þe wittnesse of Holy Scripture itself.

「若上帝是良善且公義的，為何世間存有罪惡？」此問題自古以來便激盪著神學探究之核心。此乃神義論（θεοδικία）之根本追問，非僅哲理之思辨所能盡，更須植根於聖經經文之精確釋義。

This essay advances three interconnected theses. First, that evil is not a substance created by God, but rather a *privation*—a lacking or absence—of Good, arising from the free choice of created beings who turn away from the divine order. Second, that the Hebrew concept of *sin* (חָטָא, *ḥaṭa'*) fundamentally signifies *missing the mark*, as in archery, and that the "mark" is God's Covenant—such that disobedience to the Covenant constitutes the act of "missing." Third, that sin encompasses not only the commission of wrong but also the *omission* of right—the failure and refusal to do what one knows to be good.

Þis tretis setteþ forþ thre ythreaded theses. Firstely, þat eville is nat a substaunce ycreated by God, but raþer a *wantynge*—a lakkyng or absaunce—of Goodnesse, ysprungen from þe fre chesinge of ycreated wightes who turneþ awey from Goddes ordre. Secondelich, þat þe Ebraic conceite of *synne* (חָטָא, *ḥaṭa'*) signifieþ at his roote *missynge þe marke*, as in archerie, and þat þe "marke" is Goddes Covenaunt—so þat disobeyinge þe Covenaunt makeþ one to "mysse." Thirdely, þat synne comprehendeþ nat oonly þe doynge of wronge but also þe *leavynge-undone* of righte—þe faylynge and refusynge to don þat which oon knoweþ to ben good.

本文提出三項相互關聯之論題。其一，惡並非上帝所創造之實體，而是善之「缺乏」（*privatio*）——善之匱缺與不在——乃受造者以自由意志背離神聖秩序之結果。其二，希伯來文之「罪」（חָטָא, *ḥaṭa'*）其根本意義為「未中靶心」，如射箭然，而此「靶心」即上帝之聖約——故違

背聖約即為「失的」之行為。其三，罪不僅涵蓋「行惡」之過犯，亦包括「不行善」之疏怠——知其當為而不為之失。

I. God as the Source of All Good: The Scriptural Foundation / God als Welle of Alle Goodnesse: Þe Scripture-Grounding / 上帝為一切善之根源：聖經基礎

Any inquiry into the origin of evil must commence with what Scripture declares about the nature of God. The Apostle John writes with absolute clarity: **"God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all"** (1 John 1:5, KJV). The Greek text reads: *ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστιν καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία*—"God is light, and darkness in Him there is none whatsoever." The double negation (*οὐκ … οὐδεμία*) constitutes an emphatic denial that any trace of evil, shadow, or moral deficiency exists within the divine nature. As Colin G. Kruse observes in his commentary on the Johannine Epistles, this declaration functions as the foundational axiom from which all subsequent moral and soteriological reasoning flows (Kruse, *The Letters of John*, Pillar New Testament Commentary, Eerdmans, 2000, pp. 61–63).

Alle enquirie into þe spryngynge of eville muste bigynne wyth þat which Holy Writ declareþ of þe kynde of God. Þe Apostle Johan writeþ wyth utter clernesse: **"God is lyghte, and in Hym is no derknesse at alle"** (1 Johan 1:5). Þe Greke texte redeþ: *ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστιν καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία*—"God is lyghte, and derknesse in Hym ther is noon whatsoevere." Þe double nayinge (*οὐκ … οὐδεμία*) constituteþ an emphatikal denyinge þat eny trace of eville, schadowe, or moralle wantynge dwelleþ in þe Godly kynde.

凡欲探究惡之根源者，必先由聖經所啟示之上帝本性出發。使徒約翰以絕對之明晰宣告：「上帝就是光，在祂裡面毫無黑暗」（約翰一書1:5）。希臘文原文為：*ὁ θεὸς φῶς ἐστιν καὶ*

σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία——「上帝是光，在祂裡面絕無任何黑暗。」其雙重否定（*οὐκ … οὐδεμία*）構成強調性之否認，表明在神聖本性中不存有任何一絲邪惡、幽暗或道德之虧缺。正如Colin G. Kruse於其約翰書信註釋中所論，此宣告乃一切後續道德與救恩論推理之基礎公設（Kruse，*The Letters of John*，Pillar New Testament Commentary，Eerdmans，2000，頁61–63）。

Furthermore, the creation narrative itself establishes that everything proceeding from God's creative act is intrinsically good. The refrain of Genesis 1 builds toward its climactic affirmation: **"And God saw everything that He had made, and behold, it was very good"** (Genesis 1:31). The Hebrew term used is טוֹב מְאֹד (*ṭov me'od*)—not merely "good" but "exceedingly good." As Gerhard von Rad notes in his *Genesis: A Commentary*, the divine evaluation of creation as *ṭov me'od* is not an aesthetic judgment alone but an ontological declaration: the created order, as it proceeds from God, is altogether free of defect and corruption (von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary*, Old Testament Library, Westminster Press, rev. ed. 1972, pp. 61–62). There is no verse in Scripture that records God creating evil as a substance or being.

Bovendien, þe creacion telynge itself stabliþeþ þat alle thynges proceedynge from Goddes makynge-werke is intrinsiklich good. Þe refrayne of Genesis 1 bildeþ toward his clymactik affirmynge: **"And God sawe alle thynge þat He hadde ymade, and lo, it was ful good"** (Genesis 1:31). Þe Ebraic terme yused is טוֹב מְאֹד (*ṭov me'od*)—nat mereli "good" but "passyngly good." As Gerhard von Rad noteþ in his *Genesis: A Commentary*, þe Godly waluynge of creacioun as *ṭov me'od* is nat an fairnesse-jugement aloon but an *beynge-declarynge*: þe ycreated ordre, as it procedeþ from God, is altogiþer fre of defaute and corrupcioun.

再者，創世記之創造敘事本身即確立凡出於上帝創造之工者，皆為本質性之善。創世記第一章之疊句逐步推向其高潮性之肯定：「上帝看祂所造的一切，看哪，都甚好」（創世記1:31）。希伯來文所用之詞為 טוֹב מְאֹד（*ṭov me'od*）——非僅「好」，乃「極其好」。正如Gerhard von

Rad於其《創世記註釋》中所指出，上帝對受造之物評價為 *ṭov me'od*，非僅美學之判斷，更乃存有論之宣告：受造秩序出自上帝，全然無瑕疵與敗壞（von Rad，*Genesis: A Commentary*，Old Testament Library，Westminster Press，修訂版1972，頁61–62）。聖經中無任何經文記載上帝創造惡為一實體或存有。

The supposed counter-testimony of Isaiah 45:7 requires careful exegesis. The KJV renders: *"I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil."* Yet the Hebrew word here translated "evil" is רָע (*ra'*), which possesses a semantic range encompassing calamity, disaster, and adversity—not moral evil per se. The parallelism of the verse is instructive: *light/darkness* and *peace/calamity* (*shalom/ra'*). As John N. Oswalt demonstrates in his *The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66* (NICOT, Eerdmans, 1998, pp. 203–205), the context is God's sovereignty over the fortunes of nations—specifically the rise of Cyrus—not a metaphysical claim about the divine authorship of moral wickedness. Modern translations accordingly render *ra'* as "calamity" (ESV, NASB) or "disaster" (NIV). God governs consequence and judgment; He does not author sin.

Þe semynge countir-wittnesse of Isaye 45:7 requireþ carful writ-redynge. Þe olde Englysshe renderynge seyeþ: *"I forme þe lyghte, and create derknesse: I make pees, and create eville."* Yit þe Ebraic worde here ytranslated "eville" is רָע (*ra'*), which possesseþ a brede of menyng encompassynge *mischaunce*, *wrecche*, and *adversitee*—nat moralle eville by itself. Þe parallelisme of þe vers is enstructif: *lyghte/derknesse* and *pees/mischaunce* (*shalom/ra'*). God governeþ consequence and jugement; He autoreþ nat synne.

以賽亞書45:7之表面反證須經審慎釋義。中文和合本譯為：「我造光，又造暗；我施平安，又降災禍。」然此處譯為「災禍」之希伯來文 רָע（*ra'*）其語義範圍涵蓋「災難」、「禍患」與「逆境」——非指道德性之惡。該節之平行結構甚具啟發性：光/暗與平安/災禍（*shalom/ra'*）。正如John N. Oswalt於其《以賽亞書40–66章》註釋中所論證，此處之上下文為上帝對列國命運

之主權——特別是古列之興起——而非關於上帝為道德邪惡之作者的形而上學宣稱（Oswalt, *The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40–66*, NICOT, Eerdmans, 1998, 頁203–205）。現代譯本因此將 *ra'* 譯為「災禍」或「降災」。上帝掌管後果與審判，祂並非罪之作者。

II. Evil as Privatio Boni: The Absence of Good / Eville als Wantynge of Goodnesse: Þe Absaunce of Good / 惡乃善之缺乏：善之不在

A. The Patristic and Philosophical Tradition / Þe Fadres and Wisdomlore Tradicioun / 教父與哲學傳統

The doctrine that evil possesses no positive ontological status—that it is not a *substance* but a *privation* (*privatio boni*)—constitutes one of the most enduring and rigorously articulated positions in Christian theology. Its roots extend from Plotinus through the Greek Fathers and achieve their fullest Western elaboration in Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.

Þe doctrine þat eville possesseþ no positif beynge-stature—þat it is nat a *substaunce* but a *wantynge* (*privatio boni*)—constituteþ oon of þe moste enduryng and rigorouslich yarticulated posiciouns in Cristen godlore. His rootes streccheþ from Plotinus thurgh þe Greke Fadres and acheven hir fullest Westerne elaboracioun in Augustyne of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas.

惡不具有正面存有論地位——惡非「實體」而乃「缺乏」（*privatio boni*）——此教義構成基督教神學中最持久且最嚴謹闡發之立場之一。其根源上溯柏羅丁（Plotinus），經希臘教父而於西方教會中由希波的奧古斯丁與托馬斯·阿奎那達至最完備之發展。

Athanasius of Alexandria (c. 296–373), in his foundational treatise *On the Incarnation of the Word* (*De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*), declares with striking directness: **"It is God alone Who exists; evil is non-being, the negation and antithesis of good"** (*De*

Incarnatione, §4). For Athanasius, the fall of humanity was not the introduction of a new *substance* called evil into the cosmos but rather a *turning away* from the contemplation of God—a movement toward non-being. Humanity, made from nothing (*ex nihilo*) but endowed with the *imago Dei* and the grace of the Word, began to slide back toward the nothingness from which it was made when it ceased to remain oriented toward God. Evil, in Athanasius's framework, is the corrosion that occurs when creatures abandon their proper orientation toward the Good.

Athanasius van Alexandrye (ca. 296–373), in his foundacioun-tretis *Of þe Incarnacioun of þe Worde*, declareþ wyth strikynge diretnesse: **"It is God aloon Who existeþ; eville is nat-beynge, þe nayinge and contrarietee of good"** (*De Incarnatione*, §4). For Athanasius, þe falle of mankynde was nat þe bryngynge-in of a newe *substaunce* called eville into þe worlde but raþer a *turnynge awey* from þe contemplacioun of God—a mevynge toward nat-beynge.

亞歷山大的亞他那修（約296–373），於其奠基性論著《論道成肉身》（*De Incarnatione Verbi Dei*）中，以直截了當之方式宣告：「唯上帝存有；惡乃非存有，善之否定與對立」（*De Incarnatione*，§4）。對亞他那修而言，人類之墮落並非將一名為「惡」之新「實體」引入宇宙，而是從對上帝之仰望中轉離——朝向虛無之運動。人類出於虛無（*ex nihilo*）而受造，卻蒙賜上帝之形像（*imago Dei*）與聖道之恩典；當其不再朝向上帝時，便開始滑向其所由出之虛無。在亞他那修之框架中，惡乃受造者離棄其朝向至善之正當方向時所發生之腐蝕。

Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–395) reinforced this understanding with philosophical precision. In his *Great Catechism* (*Oratio Catechetica Magna*), he writes that evil has no substantial existence (*ὑπόστασις*) of its own but is merely the inclination of the will away from God. As Morwenna Ludlow notes in her study *Gregory of Nyssa: Ancient and (Post)modern* (Oxford University Press, 2007), Gregory insisted that because evil lacks ontological substance, it cannot endure eternally—it is parasitic upon being and ultimately self-dissolving (Ludlow, pp. 85–92).

Gregorius van Nyssa (ca. 335–395) reinforceþ þis understondynge wyth wisdomlore precisioun. In his *Grete Catechisme*, he writeþ þat eville haþ no substauntialle existaunce of his owene but is mereli þe inclinacioun of þe wille awey from God. For bi-cause eville lakkeþ beynge-substaunce, it may nat enduren eternallich—it is *parasitik* upon beynge and at þe laste selfe-dissolvynge.

尼撒的貴格利（約335–395）以哲學之精確性強化了此一理解。於其《大教理問答》（*Oratio Catechetica Magna*）中，他寫道：惡不具有其自身之實質存在（*ὑπόστασις*），僅為意志偏離上帝之傾向。正如Morwenna Ludlow於其研究著作《尼撒的貴格利：古代與（後）現代》（Oxford University Press，2007）中所論，貴格利堅持因惡缺乏存有論之實質，故不能永恆存續——它寄生於存有之上，終將自行消解（Ludlow，頁85–92）。

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (c. 5th–6th century), in Chapter 4 of *The Divine Names* (*De Divinis Nominibus*), provided what became perhaps the most influential philosophical treatment of evil in the Eastern tradition. He writes: **"Evil is neither a being nor a good… Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some good joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite"** (DN IV, §32). Evil cannot produce anything; it exists only as a corruption or deficiency attached to something that is, in itself, good. As Thomas Aquinas would later cite this passage approvingly, noting: "It must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good" (*Summa Theologiae* I, q.48, a.1).

Pseudo-Dionysius Þe Areopagite (ca. 5de–6de centurie), in Chapitir 4 of *Þe Godly Names*, provyded þat which bicome perchaunce þe moste influencialle wisdomlore tretement of eville in þe Estren tradicioun. He writeþ: **"Eville is neiþer a beynge nor a good… Eville dooþ nat, nor is it desired, but by vertu of som good yjoined to it: while of itself it is no-thynge definit."**

偽丟尼修（約5至6世紀），於《論神聖名號》（*De Divinis Nominibus*）第四章中，提供了東方傳統中或許最具影響力之惡之哲學論述。他寫道：「惡既非存有，亦非善……惡不行動，亦不被渴望，唯藉依附於善而存；就其自身而言，惡乃虛無不定之物」（DN IV，§32）。惡無法產生任何事物；它僅作為對本身為善之事物的腐蝕或缺損而存在。正如托馬斯·阿奎那後來讚許地引用此段落，指出：「惡之名所意指者，乃善之不在」（《神學大全》第一集，問題48，第一條）。

Augustine of Hippo (354–430) formulated the *privatio boni* doctrine with particular force in response to his former Manichaean beliefs, which posited evil as an independent, co-eternal substance alongside good. In his *Confessions* (Book VII, chapters 12–16), Augustine recounts his intellectual liberation from dualism: **"And I inquired what wickedness was, and I found it was no substance, but a perversion of the will, turned away from Thee, O God, the supreme substance, toward lower things"** (*Confessiones* VII.16.22; trans. Pusey). In the *Enchiridion* (chapters 11–14), Augustine systematizes this insight: evil is not a nature but a *wound* upon a nature; it can exist only within good, as a privation, as blindness exists in an eye. Without the eye—without the good substrate—there would be nothing for blindness to afflict. As Augustine writes: **"Evil exists only in good"** (*Enchiridion*, ch. 14). And again: **"There is no possible source of evil except good"** (*Contra Julianum* I.9).

Augustyne van Hippo (354–430) formulerede þe *privatio boni* doctrine wyth particlar strengþe in answere to his formere Manichean bileves, which sette forþ eville as an independent, co-eternalle substaunce bisyde good. In his *Confessiouns*, Augustyne recounteþ his intellectuelle liberacioun from dualisme: **"And I enquered what wykkednesse was, and I fond it was no substaunce, but a perversionn of þe wille, yturned awey from Þee, O God, þe sovereyne substaunce, toward lowere thynges"** (*Confessiones* VII.16.22). In þe *Enchiridion*, Augustyne seyeþ þat eville is nat a nature but a *wounde* upon a nature; it may existe oonly wiþinne good, as a privation, as blyndenesse existeþ in an eye.

希波的奧古斯丁（354–430）以特殊之力度闡述了「善之缺乏」教義，此乃回應其昔日所持之摩尼教信仰——摩尼教主張惡為獨立、與善同永之實體。於其《懺悔錄》（第七卷，第12–16章），奧古斯丁述說其從二元論中得到智性解放之經歷：「我探究何為邪惡，發現它並非實體，而乃意志之悖逆，從祢——至高之實體——轉向低下之物」（*Confessiones* VII.16.22；Pusey譯本）。於《手冊》（*Enchiridion*，第11–14章），奧古斯丁將此洞見系統化：惡非一本性，而乃本性上之傷口；它唯能存於善之中，作為缺乏而存在，猶如失明存於眼中。若無眼——若無善之基底——則失明無所依附。奧古斯丁寫道：「惡唯存於善之中」（*Enchiridion*，第14章）。又曰：「善以外別無惡之可能來源」（*Contra Julianum* I.9）。

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), synthesizing Augustine and Pseudo-Dionysius, offers the most architectonically rigorous account in the *Summa Theologiae*. In *Prima Pars*, Question 48, Article 1, Aquinas concludes: **"It cannot be that evil signifies being, or any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil is signified the absence of good."** In Question 49, Article 1, he further clarifies that good is the *only* possible cause of evil—not as an efficient cause that produces evil as a substance, but in the sense that evil can only arise as a deficiency *within* a good that fails to achieve its proper perfection. The sun does not create shadows; shadows arise where the sun's light is blocked (cf. Aquinas, *SCG* III.7–12; Brian Davies, *Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil*, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 51–80).

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), synthetizsynge Augustyne and Pseudo-Dionysius, offereþ þe moste architectoniklich rigorous accounte in þe *Summa Theologiae*. In *Prima Pars*, Questioun 48, Article 1, Aquinas concludeþ: **"It may nat be þat eville signifieþ beynge, or eny forme or nature. Þerfore it muste be þat by þe name of eville is signified þe absaunce of good."** Þe sonne dooþ nat create schadowes; schadowes arise where þe sonnes lyghte is yblocced.

托馬斯·阿奎那（1225–1274）綜合奧古斯丁與偽丟尼修之思想，於《神學大全》中提出最具系統建構之嚴謹論述。在《第一集》，問題48，第一條中，阿奎那總結道：**「惡不可能意指存

有，或任何形式或本性。故惡之名所意指者，必為善之不在。」**在問題49，第一條中，他進一步闡明：善乃惡唯一可能之原因——非作為產生惡之實體的動力因，而是惡只能作為善未能達成其固有完善時的缺損而產生。太陽不創造陰影；陰影產生於太陽之光被遮蔽之處（參阿奎那，*SCG* III.7–12；Brian Davies，*Thomas Aquinas on God and Evil*，Oxford University Press，2011，頁51–80）。

The modern Protestant tradition, outside the Lutheran lineage, has continued to engage this theme. **Karl Barth** (1886–1968), in *Church Dogmatics* III/3, §50, introduces the concept of *das Nichtige*—"the Nothingness"—to describe evil as that which God has *rejected* and *passed over* in His creative act. Evil is not something God willed into being but something that exists in the peculiar mode of having been denied being. It is, in Barth's haunting phrase, that which has actuality only as *that which God does not will* (Barth, *Church Dogmatics* III/3, trans. G.W. Bromiley and R.J. Ehrlich, T&T Clark, 1960, pp. 289–368).

Þe moderne Protestantisshe tradicioun, biyonde þe Luþeranisshe lyne, haþ continued to engage þis theme. **Karl Barth** (1886–1968), in *Chirche Dogmatikes* III/3, §50, introduceþ þe conceite of *das Nichtige*—"Þe Noþingnesse"—to descryben eville as þat which God haþ *yrejected* and *ypassed over* in His makynge-werke. Eville is nat somthynge God willed into beynge but somethynge þat existeþ in þe peculier mode of havynge been denied beynge.

現代新教傳統——路德宗以外——亦持續關注此主題。卡爾·巴特（1886–1968），於《教會教義學》III/3，§50中，引入 *das Nichtige*（「虛無」）之概念，將惡描述為上帝在其創造之工中所拒絕與越過之物。惡並非上帝所意願而生之物，而是以一種獨特之方式存在——作為「被拒絕賦予存有」者。用巴特那令人深思之措辭：惡僅以「上帝所不願者」之方式具有現實性（Barth，*Church Dogmatics* III/3，T&T Clark，1960，頁289–368）。

Even within the Jewish philosophical tradition, **Maimonides** (1138–1204), in the *Guide of the Perplexed* (III.10–12), argues that all evils are privations. God bestows only existence and good; evil arises from the *absence* of divine gifts, or from the material nature of created things, or from the moral failings of human beings (Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed*, trans. Shlomo Pines, University of Chicago Press, 1963, III.10–12).

Selven wiþinne þe Jewisshe wisdomlore tradicioun, **Maimonides** (1138–1204), in þe *Guide of Þe Perplexed* (III.10–12), argueþ þat alle evilles are wantynges. God bestoweþ oonly existaunce and good; eville ariseþ from þe *absaunce* of Godly giftes, or from þe materielle nature of ycreated thynges, or from þe moralle failynges of mankynde.

即便在猶太哲學傳統中，邁蒙尼德（1138–1204），於其《迷途指津》（*Guide of the Perplexed*，III.10–12）中，論證一切惡皆為缺乏。上帝唯賦予存有與善；惡產生於神聖恩賜之不在，或受造物之物質本性，或人類之道德失敗（Maimonides，*Guide of the Perplexed*，Shlomo Pines譯，University of Chicago Press，1963，III.10–12）。

C.S. Lewis (1898–1963) provided a widely accessible restatement of this doctrine. In *Mere Christianity* (Book II, Chapter 2), Lewis writes: **"Goodness is, so to speak, itself: badness is only spoiled goodness… Evil is a parasite, not an original thing."** Elsewhere, in a letter to Arthur Greeves (September 12, 1933), he writes: "Evil is a parasite. It is there only because good is there for it to spoil and confuse." Lewis's metaphor of the parasite perfectly captures the Augustinian-Thomistic insight: a parasite cannot exist without a host, and evil cannot exist without the good from which it draws its distorted pseudo-being.

C.S. Lewis (1898–1963) provyded a brede-reachynge restaterment of þis doctrine. In *Mere Cristendom*, Lewis writeþ: **"Goodnesse is, so to speke, itself: badnesse is oonly yspoiled goodnesse… Eville is a parasyte, nat an originalle thynge."** A

parasyte may nat existe wiþoute a hoste, and eville may nat existe wiþoute þe good from which it draweþ his distorted seme-beynge.

乘. 斯. 路易斯（1898–1963）為此教義提供了廣泛可及之重新闡述。於《返璞歸真》（*Mere Christianity*，第二卷，第二章）中，路易斯寫道：**「善可說是其自身；惡只是被損壞的善……惡乃寄生蟲，非原生之物。」**又於致Arthur Greeves之書信（1933年9月12日）中寫道：「惡乃寄生蟲。它之所以在，唯因善在那裡供其破壞與攪亂。」路易斯以寄生蟲為喻，精準地捕捉了奧古斯丁—阿奎那之洞見：寄生蟲離宿主不能存活，惡離善亦不能存在。

B. Evil Originates from Human Free Choice / Eville Spryngeþ from Mannes Fre Chesinge / 惡起於人之自由抉擇

Scripture is unambiguous that the capacity for evil arises not from God's creative intent but from the gift—and misuse—of free will (*liberum arbitrium*). The locus classicus is found in Moses's final address to Israel: **"I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live"** (Deuteronomy 30:19, ESV). The verb בָּחַר (*baḥar*, "choose") presupposes genuine moral agency. God does not compel obedience; He sets forth the terms of the Covenant and invites a free response.

Holy Writ is unambigu þat þe capacitee for eville ariseþ nat from Goddes creacion-entente but from þe gifte—and mis-usinge—of fre wille. Þe locus classicus is founde in Moses his laste addressynge to Israel: **"I calle hevene and erþe to witnesse ageynes you þis daye, þat I have sette bifore you lyfe and deeþ, blessinge and cursynge. Þerfore chese lyfe, þat ye and youre osprynge mowe lyven"** (Deuteronomie 30:19). Þe verbe בָּחַר (*baḥar*, "chese") presupposeþ verray moralle agencye.

聖經明確指出：惡之可能性非源自上帝之創造意圖，而乃源自自由意志（*liberum arbitrium*）之恩賜——及其誤用。經典出處見於摩西對以色列之臨終訓誡：「我今日呼天喚地向你作見

證，我將生與死、福與禍，陳明在你面前。所以你要揀選生命，使你和你的後裔都得存活」（申命記30:19）。動詞 בָּחַר（*baḥar*，「揀選」）預設了真實之道德主體性。上帝不強迫順從；祂陳明聖約之條件，邀請自由之回應。

Irenaeus of Lyon (c. 130–202), in *Against Heresies* (Book IV, Chapter 37), provides the earliest systematic patristic treatment of free will as the precondition of both virtue and evil. He writes: **"God made man a free agent from the beginning, possessing his own power, even as he does his own soul, to obey the behests of God voluntarily, and not by compulsion of God. For there is no coercion with God."** And again: **"If then it were not in our power to do or not to do these things, what reason had the apostle, and much more the Lord Himself, to give us counsel to do some things, and to abstain from others? But because man is possessed of free will from the beginning, and God is possessed of free will, in whose likeness man was created, advice is always given to him to keep fast the good, which thing is done by means of obedience to God"** (*Adversus Haereses* IV.37.1–4; ANF, Vol. I).

Irenaeus van Lyon (ca. 130–202), in *Ageyns Heresyes*, provydeþ þe erliest systematik fadres-tretement of fre wille as þe fore-condicioun of boþe vertu and eville. He writeþ: **"God made man a fre agent from þe bigynnynge, possessynge his owene powere, even as he dooþ his owene soule, to obeyen þe biddinges of God wilfullich, and nat by compulsioun of God. For þer is no coercioun wiþ God."**

里昂的愛任紐（約130–202），於《駁異端》（第四卷，第37章）中，提供了最早期關於自由意志乃德行與惡之先決條件的系統性教父論述。他寫道：「上帝從起初便造人為自由之主體，擁有其自身之能力，一如其擁有自身之靈魂，使其出於自願而非出於上帝之強迫而順從上帝之命令。因為上帝絕無強制。」又曰：「若行或不行這些事不在我們的能力之內，使徒——更遑論主自己——有何理由勸勉我們行某些事而禁戒另一些事？然而因人從起初便具有自由意志，而上帝亦具有自由意志——人正是照其形像被造——故常有勸勉臨到人，要其持守善，此乃藉順從上帝而成」（*Adversus Haereses* IV.37.1–4；ANF，第一卷）。

Irenaeus's argument is of particular importance: the very possibility of moral evil is a *necessary corollary* of genuine freedom, which is itself a *necessary condition* for genuine goodness. If creatures could not choose otherwise than good, their "good" behavior would be merely mechanical and thus possess no moral worth. As Irenaeus writes: "How can those who are ignorant of good enjoy it? Or what credit is it to those who have not aimed at it?" (*AH* IV.37.6). The existence of evil is therefore not an indictment of God's character but a testimony to the dignity He conferred upon human beings by making them free.

Irenaeus his argument is of greet importaunce: þe verray possibilitee of moralle eville is a *needfulle corollarye* of trewe fredom, which is itself a *needfulle condicioun* for trewe goodnesse. Yif ycreated wightes couden nat chesen oþer than good, hir "good" behavinge wolde ben mereli mechanikal and þus possessen no moralle worþe.

愛任紐之論證尤為重要：道德性之惡之可能性乃真正自由之必然推論，而真正自由本身又乃真正良善之必要條件。若受造者無法選擇善以外之物，其「善」的行為便僅為機械式反應，因而不具任何道德價值。正如愛任紐所寫：「不識善者何以享善？未曾追求善者何以得善之功？」（*AH* IV.37.6）。因此惡之存在非為對上帝品格之控訴，乃為對祂賦予人類尊嚴——使其自由——之見證。

The Pauline testimony confirms this anthropological reality: **"Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all people, because all sinned"** (Romans 5:12, NIV). Note the agency: sin *entered* through a *man*—through human choice—not through divine creation. The verb εἰσῆλθεν (*eisēlthen*, "entered") suggests an intrusion into a previously good order, not an original ingredient of creation. Douglas Moo, in his *The Epistle to the Romans* (NICNT, Eerdmans, 1996, pp. 319–328), emphasizes that Paul's focus is on human *responsibility*: sin is not an inevitable feature of created existence but a catastrophe introduced by free agency.

Þe Paulyne wittnesse confirmeþ þis man-knowynge realitee: **"Þerfore, just as synne entrede þe worlde thurgh oon man, and deeþ thurgh synne, and in þis wise deeþ cam to alle peple, bicause alle synned"** (Romeyns 5:12). Note þe agencye: synne *entrede* thurgh a *man*—thurgh manne chesinge—nat thurgh Godly creacioun.

保羅之見證確認了此人類學之實況：「這就如罪是從一人入了世界，死又是從罪來的；於是死就臨到眾人，因為眾人都犯了罪」（羅馬書5:12）。請注意其主體性：罪藉一「人」——藉人的選擇——「進入」世界，而非藉神聖之創造。動詞 εἰσῆλθεν（*eisēlthen*，「進入」）暗示一種對先前良善秩序之侵入，而非創造之原有成分。Douglas Moo於其《羅馬書》（NICNT，Eerdmans，1996，頁319–328）中強調保羅之焦點在於人之責任：罪非受造存在之必然特徵，而乃由自由意志引入之災難。

III. Sin as "Missing the Mark": The Hebraic Concept of חָטָא / Synne als "Missynge Þe Marke": Þe Ebraic Conceite of חָטָא / 罪為「未中靶心」：חָטָא 之希伯來概念

A. The Etymology and Biblical Usage of חָטָא (ḥaṭa') / Þe Worde-Roote and Bible-Usinge of חָטָא / חָטָא 之字源與聖經用法

The most common Hebrew word for "sin," חָטָא (*ḥaṭa'*), and its nominal derivative חַטָּאת (*ḥaṭṭa't*), derive from a root meaning fundamentally **"to miss, to fail, to err from a path or target."** This is not theological abstraction imposed retrospectively; it is demonstrable from the concrete, non-moral uses of the word within the Hebrew Bible itself.

Þe moste commune Ebraic worde for "synne," חָטָא (*ḥaṭa'*), and his noun-forme חַטָּאת (*ḥaṭṭa't*), derivveþ from a roote menynge fundamentallich **"to mysse, to faile, to erren from a paþ or marke."** Þis is nat godlore-abstractioun ymposed in hindsight; it is

demonstrable from þe concrete, nat-moralle uses of þe worde wiþinne þe Ebraic Bible itself.

最常見之希伯來文「罪」字 חָטָא（*ḥaṭa'*）及其名詞衍生形式 חַטָּאת（*ḥaṭṭa't*），源自一根本意義為**「未中、失誤、偏離路徑或目標」**之字根。此非後來回溯性強加之神學抽象，而可由希伯來聖經中該字之具體、非道德用法加以證明。

The decisive proof-text is **Judges 20:16**: **"Among all this people there were seven hundred chosen men left-handed; every one could sling stones at a hair breadth, and not miss"** (KJV). The Hebrew reads: וְלֹא יַחֲטִא (*velo yaḥăṭi'*)—literally, **"and not sin"** or "and not miss." Adam Clarke, in his classic commentary, observes: **"Here we have the true import of the term sin; it signifies simply to miss the mark, and is well translated in the New Testament by ἁμαρτάνω (*hamartanō*), from ἀ, negative, and μάρπτω, to hit the mark"** (Clarke, *Commentary on Judges 20:16*, 1832). The Septuagint renders this phrase as καὶ οὐκ ἐξαμαρτάνοντες (*kai ouk examartanontes*)—using the very root (*ἁμαρτ-*) that would become the standard New Testament term for sin.

Þe decisive proof-texte is **Juges 20:16**: **"Among alle þis peple þer were seven hundreþ chosene men lefte-handen; every oon coude slynge stones at a heer brede, and nat mysse."** Þe Ebraic redeþ: וְלֹא יַחֲטִא (*velo yaḥăṭi'*)—literallich, **"and nat synne"** or "and nat mysse." Adam Clarke, in his commentarye, obserueþ: **"Here we haven þe trewe importe of þe terme synne; it signifieþ symply to mysse þe marke."**

決定性之經文依據為士師記**20:16**：「在眾百姓中有七百精選之人，都是左手便利的，能用機弦甩石打準，毫不失誤」。希伯來文為：וְלֹא יַחֲטִא（*velo yaḥăṭi'*）——直譯為**「且不犯罪」或「且不失誤」。**Adam Clarke**於其經典註釋中指出：「此處我們見到『罪』一詞之真正含義；它簡單地意味著『未中靶心』，在新約中恰當地以 ἁμαρτάνω（*hamartanō*）譯出，此字源自 ἀ

（否定）與 μάρπτω（擊中靶心）」**（Clarke, *Commentary on Judges 20:16*, 1832）。七十士譯本以 καὶ οὐκ ἐξαμαρτάνοντες 譯此句——正用了日後成為新約「罪」之標準術語的同一字根（*ἁμαρτ-*）。

Robin C. Cover, in his article "Sin, Sinners (OT)" in the *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (Vol. VI, Doubleday, 1992, pp. 31–40), confirms that the primary denotation of חָטָא is "to miss" or "to fail to reach," and that its extension to the moral and religious sphere involves the metaphorical notion of failing to meet a standard—specifically, the standard of God's expressed will. Rolf Knierim, in his landmark study *Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlaghaus, 1965), similarly demonstrates that the three principal Hebrew terms for sin—חָטָא (*ḥaṭa'*, to miss the mark), עָוֹן (*'avon*, crookedness or perversion), and פֶּשַׁע (*pesha'*, rebellion or transgression)—together express a comprehensive understanding of sin as deviation, distortion, and defiance of the Covenant relationship.

Robin C. Cover, in his article in þe *Ankir Bible Dictionarye*, confirmeþ þat þe primal denotacioun of חָטָא is "to mysse" or "to faile to rechen," and þat his extencion to þe moralle and religiouse reame involveþ þe metaphorike nocioun of failynge to mete a standarde—specifilich, þe standarde of Goddes expressed wille.

Robin C. Cover於《錨式聖經辭典》（*Anchor Bible Dictionary*, 第六卷, Doubleday, 1992, 頁31–40）中之文章確認：חָטָא 之首要語義為「未中」或「未及」，其延伸至道德與宗教領域涉及一隱喻性概念：未能達到某一標準——具體而言，即上帝所明示之旨意之標準。Rolf Knierim於其里程碑式研究《舊約中罪之主要概念》（*Die Hauptbegriffe für Sünde im Alten Testament*, Gütersloh, 1965）中同樣論證：希伯來文罪之三個主要術語——חָטָא（*ḥaṭa'*, 未中靶心）、עָוֹן（*'avon*, 彎曲或悖逆）、פֶּשַׁע（*pesha'*, 叛逆或過犯）——共同表達了對罪的全面理解：偏離、扭曲、以及對聖約關係之悖逆。

B. The Mark Is the Covenant / Þe Marke is Þe Covenaunt / 靶心即聖約

If sin is "missing the mark," then the "mark" itself must be identified. The covenantal structure of Hebrew Scripture provides the answer. The "mark" at which the faithful Israelite aims is the **Covenant of God**—the *berith* (בְּרִית)—the totality of God's revealed will as expressed in His commandments, statutes, and ordinances.

Yif synne is "missynge þe marke," þan þe "marke" itself muste be identified. Þe covenauntal structure of Ebraic Scripture provideþ þe answere. Þe "marke" at which þe feiþfulle Israelite aimeþ is þe **Covenaunt of God**—þe *berith* (בְּרִית)—þe totalitee of Goddes revealed wille as expressed in His comaundementes, statutes, and ordenaunces.

若罪乃「未中靶心」，則「靶心」本身必須被指認。希伯來聖經之聖約結構提供了答案。忠信之以色列人所瞄準之「靶心」即上帝之聖約——*berith*（בְּרִית）——上帝所啟示之旨意之全體，表達於其誡命、律例與典章之中。

Psalm 119:11 declares: **"Thy word have I hid in mine heart, that I might not sin against Thee"** (KJV). The parallelism is precise: to have God's word (*dabar*) within is the opposite of sinning (*ḥaṭa'*) against God. The word functions as the target; sin is the failure to align one's life with it. **Psalm 119:176** further laments: **"I have gone astray like a lost sheep; seek thy servant; for I do not forget thy commandments."** The verb תָּעִיתִי (*ta'ithi*, "I have strayed") conveys the image of wandering from the prescribed path—the covenantal trajectory along which God directs His people.

Psalme 119:11 declareþ: **"Þin worde have I hidde in myn herte, þat I myghte nat synne ageynes Þee."** Þe parallelisme is precys: to haven Goddes worde wiþinne is þe contrarie of synnynge ageynes God. Þe worde fonctioneþ as þe marke; synne is þe faylynge to alignen oones lyfe wyth it.

詩篇**119:11**宣告：**「我將祢的話藏在心裡，免得我得罪祢。」其平行結構甚為精確：將上帝之話語（***dabar***）藏於心內，乃犯罪（***ḥaṭa'***）之反面。話語充當靶心；罪乃未能使生命與之對

齊。詩篇**119:176**更嘆道:「我如亡羊走迷了路;求祢尋找僕人，因我不忘記祢的命令。」**動詞 תָּעִיתִי（*ta'ithi*,「我走迷了」）傳達偏離指定道路之意象——即上帝引導其子民前行之聖約軌道。

The covenantal context is further established by God's own terms of blessing and curse in **Deuteronomy 28–30**. Obedience to the Covenant brings blessing; disobedience—missing the mark—brings curse. The entire system presupposes that the people *can* obey and that their failure to do so is a culpable deviation from the standard God has clearly established. As Walter Brueggemann observes in his *Theology of the Old Testament* (Fortress Press, 1997, pp. 181–194), the Deuteronomic theology of retribution is built upon the conviction that Israel possesses genuine moral agency and that faithfulness or unfaithfulness to the Covenant determines the community's destiny.

Þe covenauntal contexte is forþer ystablisshed by Goddes owene termes of blessinge and cursynge in Deuteronomie 28–30. Obeyinge þe Covenaunt bryngeþ blessinge; disobeyinge—missynge þe marke—bryngeþ cursynge.

聖約之背景進一步由上帝在申命記**28–30**章中所定之祝福與咒詛之條件所確立。遵行聖約帶來祝福;違背——未中靶心——帶來咒詛。整個體系預設百姓能夠遵行，而其未能遵行乃對上帝已清楚確立之標準的可歸咎偏離。正如Walter Brueggemann於其《舊約神學》（Fortress Press，1997，頁181–194）中所觀察，申命記之報應神學建立於此信念之上:以色列具有真實之道德主體性，而對聖約之忠信或不忠信決定了群體之命運。

In the New Testament, this understanding is preserved through the Greek word ἁμαρτία (*hamartia*), which the Septuagint regularly uses to translate חַטָּאת. When Paul writes, **"For all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God"** (Romans 3:23), the verb ὑστεροῦνται (*hysterountai*, "fall short, lack") reinforces the "missing the mark" semantic

field. The "glory of God" (δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ) is the mark—the standard of divine righteousness that humanity was created to reflect and has failed to reach.

In þe Newe Testament, þis understondynge is ypreserved thurgh þe Greke worde ἁμαρτία (*hamartia*). Whan Paule writeþ, **"For alle have synned and fallen shorte of þe glorye of God"** (Romeyns 3:23), þe verbe ὑστεροῦνται (*hysterountai*, "fallen shorte, lakken") reinforceþ þe "missynge þe marke" semauntic felde.

在新約中，此理解藉希臘文 ἁμαρτία（*hamartia*）得以保存，七十士譯本常以此字翻譯 חַטָּאת。當保羅寫道：「因為世人都犯了罪，虧缺了上帝的榮耀」（羅馬書3:23），動詞 ὑστεροῦνται（*hysterountai*，「虧缺、不足」）強化了「未中靶心」之語義場。「上帝的榮耀」（δόξα τοῦ θεοῦ）即靶心——人類受造原為反映之神聖公義標準，卻未能達至。

IV. Sin as Omission: The Failure to Do What Is Good / Synne als Levynge-Undone: Þe Faylynge to Don Þat Which is Good / 罪為疏怠：不行善之失

A. The Biblical Teaching / Þe Bible-Techynge / 聖經之教導

The common understanding of sin focuses almost exclusively on sins of *commission*—the doing of prohibited acts. Yet Scripture teaches with equal force that sin encompasses the *omission* of good—the failure, and especially the deliberate refusal, to do what one knows to be right.

Þe commune understondynge of synne focuseþ almost exclusivelich on synnes of *doynge*—þe performynge of forboden actes. Yit Scripture techeþ wyth equalle strengþe þat synne comprehendeþ þe *levynge-undone* of good—þe faylynge, and especially þe wilfulle refusynge, to don þat which oon knoweþ to ben righte.

對罪之一般理解幾乎完全聚焦於行為之罪——做了被禁止之事。然而聖經以同等之力度教導：罪亦涵蓋善之疏怠——不行善之失，尤其是明知何為正確而蓄意不為之。

The definitive text is **James 4:17**: **"Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin"** (KJV). The Greek reads: εἰδότι οὖν καλὸν ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντι, ἁμαρτία αὐτῷ ἐστιν. The participial construction εἰδότι … καλὸν ποιεῖν ("to the one knowing to do good") establishes *knowledge* as the aggravating condition: it is precisely *because* one knows the right and refuses to act that the omission becomes sin. As Douglas Moo notes in his *The Letter of James* (PNTC, Eerdmans, 2000, pp. 211–213), James's point is that sin is not merely the violation of a prohibition but the failure to act upon known moral obligation. The sin of omission is not less culpable than the sin of commission; in some respects it is more so, because it presupposes clear moral awareness.

Þe definitif texte is **James 4:17**: **"Þerfore to him þat knoweþ to don good, and dooþ it nat, to him it is synne."** Þe Greke redeþ: εἰδότι οὖν καλὸν ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντι, ἁμαρτία αὐτῷ ἐστιν. Þe participial construkcioun εἰδότι … καλὸν ποιεῖν ("to þe oon knowynge to don good") stabliþeþ *knowynge* as þe aggravacioun: it is preciselich *bicause* oon knoweþ þe righte and refuseþ to acte þat þe levynge-undone bicomeþ synne.

決定性之經文為雅各書**4:17**：**「人若知道行善，卻不去行，這就是他的罪了。」**希臘文為：εἰδότι οὖν καλὸν ποιεῖν καὶ μὴ ποιοῦντι, ἁμαρτία αὐτῷ ἐστιν。分詞結構 εἰδότι … καλὸν ποιεῖν（「那知道行善的人」）確立知識為加重罪責之條件：正因知道何為正確卻拒絕行動，此疏怠方成為罪。正如Douglas Moo於其《雅各書》（PNTC，Eerdmans，2000，頁211–213）中所論，雅各之要點在於：罪不僅是違反禁令，亦是未依已知之道德義務行動。疏怠之罪不比行為之罪較輕；在某些方面反更嚴重，因其預設了明確之道德認知。

This teaching echoes across the biblical canon. In the parable of the sheep and the goats (**Matthew 25:31–46**), the condemned are judged not for what they *did* but for what they *failed to do*: "I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink, I was a stranger and you did not welcome me" (vv. 42–43). The sins enumerated are entirely sins of omission. The failure to act on behalf of the vulnerable *is itself* the transgression.

Þis techynge echoþ acros þe bible-kanoun. In þe parabole of þe schepe and þe gotes (**Mathewe 25:31–46**), þe ycondemned are juged nat for what þey *diden* but for what þey *faileden to don*: "I was hongry and ye yaf me no mete, I was þirsty and ye yaf me no drynke, I was a straunger and ye welcomed me nat."

此教導在聖經正典中迴響不絕。在綿羊與山羊之比喻中（馬太福音**25:31–46**），被定罪者非因其所行之事，而因其所未行之事：「我餓了，你們不給我吃；渴了，你們不給我喝；我作客旅，你們不留我住」（42–43節）。所列舉之罪全然為疏怠之罪。不為軟弱者行動本身即為罪過。

Similarly, Jesus's parable of the Good Samaritan (**Luke 10:30–37**) implicitly condemns the priest and the Levite not for any evil act but for their *passing by on the other side*—their refusal to do what they knew to be right. And in **Luke 12:47**, Jesus declares: **"And that servant who knew his master's will and did not prepare himself or do according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes"** (NKJV). Again, the emphasis falls on *knowing and not doing*.

Similerly, Jesu his parabole of þe Good Samaritane (**Luke 10:30–37**) condempneþ þe preest and þe Levite nat for eny eville acte but for hir *passinge by on þe oþer syde*—hir refusynge to don þat which þey knewen to ben righte.

同樣地，耶穌之好撒瑪利亞人比喻（路加福音**10:30–37**）隱含地定罪祭司與利未人，非因其行惡，乃因其從旁邊過去——拒絕行其所知為當行之事。又於路加福音**12:47**，耶穌宣告：**

「僕人知道主人的意思，卻不預備，又不順他的意思行，那僕人必多受責打。」**再次強調知而不行。

B. The Theological Significance of Omission / Þe Godlore Importaunce of Levynge-Undone / 疏怠之神學意義

The doctrine of the sin of omission deepens our understanding of sin as "missing the mark." One can miss the mark not only by shooting in the wrong direction (commission) but also by **refusing to draw the bow at all** (omission). The archer who sees the target, understands that he must shoot, possesses the skill and the arrow, yet stands idle—this archer has "missed the mark" as surely as the one who sends his arrow astray. Indeed, the former may be more culpable, for his failure is not one of *capacity* but of *will*.

Þe doctrine of þe synne of levynge-undone deepeneþ oure understondynge of synne as "missynge þe marke." Oon may mysse þe marke nat oonly by schetynge in þe wronge direccioun (doynge) but also by **refusynge to drawen þe bowe at alle** (levynge-undone). Þe archer who seeþ þe marke, understondeþ þat he muste schete, possesseþ þe skille and þe arwe, yit stondeþ idle—þis archer haþ "missed þe marke" as surelich as he þat sendeþ his arwe astraye.

疏怠之罪之教義深化了我們對罪為「未中靶心」之理解。人不僅因射錯方向（行為之罪）而未中靶心，亦因拒絕拉弓（疏怠之罪）而未中。一位弓箭手看見靶心，明白必須射擊，擁有技藝與箭矢，卻袖手旁觀——此弓箭手之「未中靶心」與射偏之人無異。事實上，前者或更為可責，因其失敗非能力之不足，乃意志之不為。

As **John Calvin** (who, while sharing some intellectual heritage with the broader Reformed tradition, is here cited independently of the Lutheran lineage) observes in his *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (II.i.8–9), the corruption of human will consists not only in its active tendency toward evil but in its *failure to will the good*—its sluggishness,

its moral inertia, its refusal to pursue what conscience and divine law alike command (Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Westminster Press, 1960, II.i.8–9). Calvin emphasizes that the human will, though not destroyed by the Fall, is so deeply compromised that it consistently fails to do what it *knows* to be right—precisely the condition James describes.

Als **Johan Calvin** observeþ in his *Institutes*, þe corrupcioun of manne his wille consisteþ nat oonly in his actiue tendaunce toward eville but in his *faylynge to willen þe good*—his slogishnesse, his moralle inercye, his refusynge to pursuen þat which conscience and Godly lawe alyke comaundeth.

正如約翰·加爾文（此處引用獨立於路德宗脈絡）於其《基督教要義》（II.i.8–9）中所觀察，人類意志之敗壞不僅在於其趨向惡之主動傾向，更在於其不能意願善——其懈怠、道德之惰性、拒絕追求良知與神聖律法所共同命令之事（Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Westminster Press, 1960, II.i.8–9）。加爾文強調：人之意志雖未因墮落而毀滅，但已深受損害，以致持續未能行其所知為正確之事——正乃雅各所描述之狀況。

V. Synthesis and Conclusion / Samknyttynge and Conclusioun / 綜合與結論

The threads of this inquiry converge upon a coherent and scripturally grounded theodicy. Let us draw them together.

Þe þredes of þis enquirie convergen upon a coherent and writ-ygrounded godly-ryghtwisinge. Late us drawen hem togiþer.

本探究之諸線索匯聚成一融貫且植根聖經之神義論。茲將其歸納如下。

First, evil is not a substance created by God. God is pure light, and in Him is no darkness at all (1 John 1:5). Everything He made was "very good" (Genesis 1:31). Evil, as Athanasius teaches, is "non-being, the negation and antithesis of good." As Augustine, Aquinas, Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa, Karl Barth, Maimonides, and C.S. Lewis all affirm from their diverse traditions, evil is a *privation*—the absence of good that ought to be present. Darkness is not a thing in itself but the absence of light. Cold is not a substance but the absence of heat. Evil is not an entity but the absence of the good that God intended for His creation.

Firstely, eville is nat a substaunce ycreated by God. God is pure lyghte, and in Hym is no derknesse at alle (1 Johan 1:5). Alle thynge He made was "ful good" (Genesis 1:31). Eville is a *wantynge*—þe absaunce of good þat oughte to been present. Derknesse is nat a thynge in itself but þe absaunce of lyghte. Eville is nat an entitee but þe absaunce of þe good þat God entended for His creacioun.

其一，惡非上帝所創造之實體。上帝是純粹之光，在祂裡面毫無黑暗（約翰一書1:5）。祂所造的一切都「甚好」（創世記1:31）。惡，如亞他那修所教導，乃「非存有，善之否定與對立」。正如奧古斯丁、阿奎那、偽丟尼修、尼撒的貴格利、巴特、邁蒙尼德與路易斯從其各異之傳統中共同肯定：惡乃缺乏——應在而不在之善。黑暗非一實物，而乃光之不在。寒冷非一實體，而乃熱之不在。惡非一存有，而乃上帝為其受造物所命定之善的不在。

Second, this privation arises not from divine causation but from **human free choice**. God, as Irenaeus affirms, made humanity free "from the beginning" and governs "not by compulsion." The Covenant set before Israel—"life and death, blessing and curse" (Deuteronomy 30:19)—presupposes the capacity and responsibility of choice. When human beings turn from the contemplation of God (Athanasius), when they reject the good that God offers (Irenaeus), when they walk in darkness rather than light (1 John 1:6)—they do not encounter an independently existing "evil." They *create a void*. They

evacuate the space that good should occupy. Evil is the shadow cast by their turning away from the light.

Secondelich, þis wantynge ariseþ nat from Godly causacioun but from **manne his fre chesinge**. God, as Irenaeus affirmeþ, made mankynde fre "from þe bigynnynge" and governeþ "nat by compulsioun." Whan manne turneþ from þe contemplacioun of God, he dooþ nat encountre an independentlich existinge "eville." He *createþ a voyde*. He evacuateþ þe space þat good sholde occupye. Eville is þe schadowe ycast by manne his turnynge awey from þe lyghte.

其二，此缺乏非源自神聖因果，而源自人之自由選擇。上帝，如愛任紐所肯定，「從起初」便造人為自由者，且「非以強制」治理。陳明於以色列面前之聖約——「生與死、福與禍」（申命記30:19）——預設了選擇之能力與責任。當人類轉離對上帝之仰望（亞他那修），當他們拒絕上帝所賜之善（愛任紐），當他們行在黑暗中而非光明中（約翰一書1:6）——他們並非遭遇一獨立存在之「惡」。他們創造了虛空。他們掏空了善所應佔據之空間。惡乃其背光而行時所投射之陰影。

Third, sin, in its original Hebraic conception, is fundamentally "missing the mark" (חָטָא). The mark is the Covenant—the totality of God's expressed will. To disobey the Covenant is to miss the mark. To deviate from its terms is to sin. This is confirmed not only by the etymological evidence of Judges 20:16 but by the entire covenantal structure of Deuteronomy, the Psalms, and the Prophets. The New Testament preserves this understanding through ἁμαρτία (Romans 3:23) and the concept of "falling short of the glory of God."

Thirdely, synne, in his originalle Ebraic concepcioun, is fundamentallich "missynge þe marke" (חָטָא). Þe marke is þe Covenaunt—þe totalitee of Goddes expressed wille. To disobeyen þe Covenaunt is to mysse þe marke. Þis is confirmed nat oonly by þe

worde-roote evidence of Juges 20:16 but by þe hole covenauntal structure of Deuteronomie, þe Psalmes, and þe Prophetes.

其三，罪，就其原初之希伯來概念而言，根本上乃「未中靶心」（חָטָא）。靶心即聖約——上帝所明示之旨意之全體。違背聖約即未中靶心。偏離其條件即犯罪。此不僅由士師記20:16之字源證據所確認，更由申命記、詩篇與先知書之整體聖約結構所證實。新約藉 ἁμαρτία（羅馬書3:23）及「虧缺上帝的榮耀」之概念保存此理解。

Fourth, sin is not limited to the commission of wrong; it equally encompasses the **failure to do what is right**, especially when one possesses the knowledge to act rightly. James 4:17 stands as the clearest declaration: "To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin." Jesus's parables of the sheep and the goats, the Good Samaritan, and the unworthy servant all reinforce this teaching. One misses the mark not only by shooting awry but by **refusing to shoot at all**. The Covenant of God demands not merely the avoidance of evil but the *active pursuit of good*—"to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God" (Micah 6:8).

Fourþely, synne is nat limited to þe doynge of wronge; it equalich comprehendeþ þe **faylynge to don þat which is righte**, especiali whan oon possesseþ þe knowynge to acte rightlich. James 4:17 stondeþ as þe clerest declaracioun. Oon mysseþ þe marke nat oonly by schetynge awrye but by **refusynge to schete at alle**. Þe Covenaunt of God demandeþ nat mereli þe eschuynge of eville but þe *actif pursuynge of good*—"to don justise, and to loven mercy, and to walken humblely wyth þy God" (Michah 6:8).

其四，罪不限於行惡之過犯；同等地涵蓋不行善之失，尤其當人具備正確行動之知識時。雅各書4:17乃最明確之宣告：「人若知道行善，卻不去行，這就是他的罪了。」耶穌之綿羊與山羊、好撒瑪利亞人、以及無用僕人之比喻皆強化此教導。人不僅因射偏而未中靶心，亦因拒絕射擊而未中。上帝之聖約要求的不僅是避惡，更是積極行善——「行公義，好憐憫，存謙卑的心，與你的上帝同行」（彌迦書6:8）。

In sum, the goodness and righteousness of God are not contradicted by the existence of evil and sin. Rather, evil testifies—by its very nature as privation—to the ontological priority and supremacy of the good. And sin testifies—by its nature as "missing the mark"—to the existence of a mark worth aiming at: the Covenant of the living God, who in His infinite mercy not only sets the target but, through the redemptive work of Christ, draws the wayward archer back to the line, places the bow once more in his hands, and whispers: *Choose life*.

In summe, þe goodnesse and ryghtwisinge of God are nat contradicted by þe existaunce of eville and synne. Raþer, eville wittnessyth—by his verray kynde as wantynge—to þe beynge-prioritee and sovereyntee of þe good. And synne wittnessyth—by his kynde as "missynge þe marke"—to þe existaunce of a marke worþe aimynge at: þe Covenaunt of þe lyvynge God, who in His infinite mercie nat oonly setteþ þe marke but, thurgh þe redempcioun-werke of Crist, draweþ þe weywarde archer back to þe lyne, placeþ þe bowe ones more in his hondes, and whispereþ: *Chese lyfe*.

總而言之，上帝之良善與公義並未因惡與罪之存在而受矛盾。相反，惡以其作為缺乏之本性——見證了善之存有論優先性與至上性。而罪以其作為「未中靶心」之本性——見證了一值得瞄準之靶心的存在：永生上帝之聖約。祂以其無限之憐憫不僅設立了靶心，更藉基督救贖之工，將偏離之弓箭手引回射線，再次將弓置於其手中，低語道：揀選生命。

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Soli Deo Gloria

To God Aloon Be Glorye

唯獨上帝得榮耀